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| The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual | 
 enlarge | Creators: John A. Nagl, David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, Sarah Sewall
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Category: Book
List Price: $15.00
Buy New: $9.25
You Save: $5.75 (38%)
New (27) Used (16) from $9.00
Avg. Customer Rating:  18 reviews
Sales Rank: 2128
Media: Paperback
Edition: University of Chicago Press Ed. /
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 472
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.4
Dimensions (in): 8.8 x 6 x 1.1
ISBN: 0226841510
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.0218
EAN: 9780226841519
ASIN: 0226841510
Publication Date: July 4, 2007
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Condition: Brand New, Perfect Condition, Please allow 4-14 business days for delivery. 100% Money Back Guarantee, Over 1,000,000 customers served.
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Product Description
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.
The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine.
An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come.
The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 13 more reviews...
 for soldiers or graduate students? September 7, 2008
I've long nutured a private grievance against FM 3-24, which suddenly broke surface when I read this delicious comment by Steve Cole in The New Yorker this week: "Its reception reflected ... the appeal of counter-insurgency among sections of the country's liberal-minded intelligentsia. This was warfare for northeastern graduate students--complex, blended with politics, designed to build countries rather than destroy them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a doctrine with particular appeal to people who would never own a gun."
A more scholarly analysis of FM 3-24's failings, by Andrew Salamone, appears in the August edition of the online Small Wars Journal. He thinks that the historical examples in the manual are too selective, and warns: "While the current application of the new doctrine appears to be showing signs of success in Iraq, at least in terms of metrics measuring levels of violence and U.S. casualties, our enemy's well documented strategic, operational, and tactical adaptability all but guarantees that current doctrine will be out of date for the next conflict and result in the well known axiom of trying to 'fight the last war again'."
Insightful and comprehensive September 5, 2008
The Counterinsurgency Field Manual is a surprisingly well considered text on the nature of insurgency and the points where the course of an insurgency can be influenced.
Something is (or should be) rather confusing about the U.S. military. Since the inception of the Continental Army in the American Revolution, the U.S. military has been involved with counterinsurgency operations almost constantly, at home and abroad. (Put this way, Americans were waging counterinsurgency since before there was a United States; the French and Indian War...) What is confusing is 'why isn't the U.S. better at it?'
Setting this underlying question to one side, this text sets forth a framework for understanding the causes of insurgencies, and for dealing with them. The full scope of cultural, economic, social, political, and other factors are addressed in considerable detail, along with approaches to influencing these factors to address the root causes of insurgency. It is a robust, comprehensive work that can provide an adaptable conceptual structure for anyone involved in counterinsurgency or issues relating to counterinsurgency.
The big question in my mind; Why did the Army have to manage developing this process, when more than half the work required to respond to an insurgency should be done or overseen by the State Department? Why do soldiers have to arrange economic reconstruction and infrastructure development? Aren't those folks at the State Department competent to do all this stuff?
E.M. Van Court
Excellent & See Social Networking Analysis (SNA) Appendix July 9, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
I believe this manual is an excellent overview of counterinsurgency strategy and some tactics. This includes the broad strategy as well as to the drill down for the units/teams/boots on the ground. Its stated audience is for battalion commanders and their staff and higher. I would recommend it to any soldier, sailor or marine regardless of rank and for U.S. citizens generally who have an interest in the topic.
According to the manual, the host nation (HN) and the counterinsurgency force (COIN) will win if they can provide security first, and then other functions of a responsive - responsive to the HN populace - HN government. Otherwise, the populace will seek security and services elsewhere (i.e., in insurgent organizations/militias). This is not necessarily a sequential ordering. While basic security is fundamental - once a baseline is reached - other governmental functions responsive to HN's populace's concerns should also be instituted, supported, and reinforced, while still improving and accelerating the improvement of the security environment for the populace. One example used is how insurgency organizations/militias can destabilize the security environment and create insecurity through terrorist strikes, in order to then be viewed by the populace as the cure to the insecurity by operating militias to defend against such insecurity, and thus try to gain popular support.
Bottom line: creation, maintenance and sustainment (or assisting/building up) of legitimacy in the host nation vs. the insurgent organizations is the contest and crux of the matter. Insurgency and counterinsurgency is a fight for the support of the populace (i.e., the big middle). This conclusion should have been clear by now - insurgency has been with us for a very long time. For some examples, in the West, you can go back to at least to Julius Caesar for lessons; see also Napoleon; in the East, you can go back to at least to Sun-Tzu's The Art of War.
According to the manual, to win an insurgency/counterinsurgency type conflict, requires staying power without intentional or unintentional signaling of wavering support for staying the distance, at least until the HN has achieved the "tipping point" in terms of legitimacy and popular support.
As an aside, there is a good appendix on Social Network Analysis (SNA), which provides a cogent overview of some of the key concepts for those not familiar with SNA or its use in war, conflict, or intelligence.
Required reading for foreign staff and U.S. leaders June 1, 2008
This manual should be required reading for any candidate for public office at a national level, as well as all foreign staff personnel. After reading the manual I was better able to understand the motivations and actions of the various factions within Iran today. It also re-enforces the idea that terrorism / insurgency is not just an issue for a single nation, but anymore is a global issue.
Best Military Manual in Ages!! May 22, 2008
This is the best manual that the military has ever published. While it is very thorough and covers every aspect of how to run a successful counterinsurgency, it is broken down into easy to understand concepts. Designed for commanders at all levels, it easily applies to every military member involved in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. This should be a must read for anyone deploying to the AOR, military or civilian as it will shape the way you think, speak, and act while trying to successfully end the insurgency that grips these countries.
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