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Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium
Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium

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Authors: Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, Leslie Young
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Category: Book

List Price: $120.00
Buy New: $99.86
You Save: $20.14 (17%)



New (6) Used (9) from $65.00

Avg. Customer Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars 2 reviews
Sales Rank: 3940307

Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 458
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.6
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6 x 1.1

ISBN: 0521362474
Dewey Decimal Number: 382.70973
EAN: 9780521362474
ASIN: 0521362474

Publication Date: August 25, 1989
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Condition: Brand new item. Over 3.5 million customers served. Order now. Selling online since 1995. Few left in stock - order soon. Code: C20080812190856B

Also Available In:

  • Paperback - Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium

Editorial Reviews:

Product Description
This book provides a special interest theory of protection, developing a full general equilibrium theory that explains the distribution of income with goods markets, factor markets, lobbies, political parties, and voters all pursuing their self interest. This probabilistic voting model shows how well-organized groups can use seemingly irrational government policies to exploit poorly organized groups. Given rational predatory behavior between these groups, protection or any other redistributive policy that improves the chances of election of a party increases political efficiency. This can create an economic black hole, conditions under which an entire economy can disappear into lobbying. Paradoxically, the tariff rates accompanying an economic black hole are very low. The economic waste is confined to lobbying costs. The book contains both theoretical and empirical work explaining protection in the United States (1900-1988) and levels of protection in about sixty foreign countries in the 1980s.


Customer Reviews:

4 out of 5 stars The most formally sophisticated model of its kind   August 14, 2008

This is a fine book, easily the most formally sophisticated model of its kind. The idea is to formalize political economy, getting beyond stale ideological discussions, and instead plop down an entire political subsystem in the middle of a standard (if simplistic) general equilibrium economic model. Groups allocate resources between economic and political activity; parties position themselves to gather financial support as well as votes. The economic and political consequences of their mutual decisions play out in a minimax general equilibrium fashion. Repays detailed study.



5 out of 5 stars loved it   June 7, 2000
 0 out of 2 found this review helpful

I never would have been able to understand this kind of technology if i didn't read the book!

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