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| The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order | 
 enlarge | Author: Parag Khanna
Publisher: Random House
Category: Book
List Price: $29.00
Buy New: $17.23
You Save: $11.77 (41%)
New (37) Used (16) Collectible (1) from $11.99
Avg. Customer Rating:  29 reviews
Sales Rank: 38994
Media: Hardcover
Edition: 1
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 496
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.8
Dimensions (in): 9.5 x 6.1 x 1.4
ISBN: 1400065089
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.1
EAN: 9781400065080
ASIN: 1400065089
Publication Date: March 4, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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| Customer Reviews:
 A Five Star Fraud August 4, 2008
42 out of 43 found this review helpful
Since it appears that only four and five star reviews get prominent placement at Amazon, I have decided to recast my review of this miserable book as a five-star review.
The Second World
Parag Khanna, a Washington based foreign policy analyst, has written a book titled The Second World, part geo-political tome and part travelogue. Robert Kaplan describes it as "a savvy, streetwise primer on dozens of individual countries that adds up to a coherent theory of global politics." Having been generously praised in book reviews in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Financial Times, among other publications, I ordered the book with great interest. And as I began to read this book, I was at first shocked, and then increasingly appalled, at a systematic pattern of serious errors of fact, ludicrous assertions that jarred with reality, fundamental misunderstandings of basic economics or history, cheap cliches, and recorded conversations which struck me as obviously fabricated. Every chapter is riddled with astonishing flaws, but here I will simply address those dealing with the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
Khanna's basic thesis is three-fold. He states the United States, the European Union, and China are the three dominant geo-political powers in the world today. He proceeds to argue that there is a "second world" of countries, belonging neither to the developed "first world" nor to the chronically underdeveloped "third world." And, Khanna writes, the big three global powers compete against one another for geo-political and economic advantage in this "second world," even as they themselves form regional alliances and seek to play the superpowers against one another.
None of these seem to be terribly original ideas. In his preface, Khanna states a wish to follow in the footsteps of English historian Toynbee, who in his retirement took a world tour. And in the second paragraph there is a foreboding of the tone of the book: Khanna states that a "leatherbound first edition of Toynbee's narrative" was his companion on his own world tour. Throughout, Khanna shows a predisposition for smarmy arrogance and condescension. And yet the book is shockingly empty of real insights, even as it boasts an index stretching to twenty-four pages, and an acknowledgment thanking some five hundred people. The impression is that Khanna wants you to know how many important people he knows and how many factoids he can fit into a 500 page book.
Some of the various, and numerous, factual errors that riddle the book are relatively trivial, but suggest serious sloppiness and disregard for getting facts right. For example, Yugoslavia was not part of Warsaw pact, as Khanna states. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was appointed to office in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin, and not by Vladimir Putin. Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are not all smaller by population than Manhattan, and the death toll from the civil wars in former Yugoslavia was not greater than half a million. Other obviously wrong assertions seem to be made up simply to provide lurid background color to Khanna's travelogue: the former KGB headquarters in Moscow has not been turned into "a high-class disco," expensive Moscow malls do not charge entrance fees, and police road checkpoints in Uzbekistan do not stop and check all vehicles. And other gross misstatements of fact display a simple complete lack of understanding the history and culture of the countries of which he writes: the (Orthodox) Uspenky cave monastery in Crimea is not representative of Ukraine's "proud Catholic heritage," Zoran Djindjic was not the first democratically elected leader since World War II in former Yugoslavia , and in the 1980s Yugoslav republics like Bosnia and Macedonia were not richer than Spain. Many of Khanna's wildly wrong claims sound like local myths that he has taken at face value. I can easily imagine some misguided elderly Belgrade resident waxing nostalgically for the days "when every one of our republics was richer than Spain!"
Yet more of Khanna's assertions are not merely factually wrong, but far exceed the ludicrous. In the fast paced and dangerous Russian business world, "one is safe only in the sauna, where everyone is naked and no weapons are allowed." It was news to me to learn from Khanna that every winter "waves" of Russians and "thousands of Ukrainians" freeze to death in "crumbling heatless apartment blocks." And he employs gross mischaracterizations of fact to buttress his claims. For example, according to Khanna, in 2006 Greek GDP increased 25% when the government started to account for prostitution and cigarette smuggling in its figures. In fact, the government said it would include all unreported economic activity, mostly in construction and trade, but including a "small" amount for illegal activities such as smuggling. And this is merely a sampling of patently ridiculous claims.
And for a "foreign policy whiz-kid," Khanna makes numerous and serious analytical mistakes, showing a clear misunderstanding of economics, international institutions, and international relations. The unhedged statement, "Russia's diplomatic position is purely residual," will surely surprise diplomats from Brussels to Tokyo. Noting that Gazprom's market capitalization is $300 billion leads Khanna to the conclusion that Gazprom is one third of the Russian economy, confusing market capitalization with GDP. And his bald assertion that "[n]one of Central Asian legal systems have evolved beyond Kakfaaesque" is belied by the numerous successful legislative accomplishments of Kazakhstan and its quite sophisticated legal code, for example.
He has harsh words for the United States, bordering on hysteria. Likewise, he sees the European Union as a beacon of progress and a model for the future. And yet he betrays a clear lack of understanding of EU institutions. For example, Britain does not share with Turkey a similar status of "privileged partner" of the EU, converg[ing] with the EU only when it suits their interests." And while he manages to drop the names of hundreds of obscure statesmen and scholars, there is not one mention of Jean Monnet.
And this awful book is chock-a-block with cheap cliches. Vladimir Putin is a "steely former KGB official." A "Soviet era foreign ministry building" and "Soviet era apartment buildings" alike are "hulking." Here in Moscow, there is a "perpetually insecure business caste that lives each day like its last, partying with exotic lions and dominatrix dancers, complete with plenty of caviar." One must pity the "champagne-soaked, Hummer-driving scions" of Kiev, who must settle for "fancy nightclubs such as Decadence." And "Kiev, like Moscow, is a Potemkin village."
And many of the cliches regarding Russia and Ukraine are not merely examples of poor imagination and lack of writing skill, they are downright ugly. "From cars to construction, if something in Russia works it is probably European." Khanna obviously has not been to any modern Russian manufacturing facilities. He also writes that the Baltic states view "the formerly great Russian bear like an alcoholic uncle, with a mixture f pity and concern." In a stunning bit of cultural hubris, Khanna sneers "Georgians may be Christians, but they are not European in any meaningful sense - no matter how relentlessly they fly the EU flag across the capital city, Tbilisi."
But the worst moments of Khanna's book are when he quotes conversations that seem of such dubious authenticity as to make me believe they may be fabricated, or at best the result of very selective reporting, only relating those comments that fit within his pre-existing views. "'Our pride has suffered'" explains a "Moscow intellectual over a narrow glass of [of course] ice-chilled vodka, `but this only drives our nationalism further.'" In Kiev, the locals "give lifts to strangers for a token fare." Why? "We suffered enough together, so we still trust each other." There are just too many such (anonymous) quotations that fail to ring true to trust in the author's integrity. And he also reports statements by national leaders as if they were heard in personal conversation, yet in a curiously indirect fashion that suggests otherwise. "'To hell with the Russians!' fumed Saakashvili" sounds like reportage of a personal conversation between Khanna and the Georgian president, but I suspect a more honest account would read like "the President was quoted in the Financial Times as saying `to hell with the Russians.'"
And Khanna makes innumerable observations that he believes show particular insight, but are shocking banal if thought over for a mere moment. He notes dryly that Turkey is "a country that has fought wars with nearly all its neighbours." Well, so is France. And in fact just about every country which has been around for the 20th century, or earlier, has fought its neighbours at one time or another. He also notes with immense concern that "Russian and Chinese firms now control most of [Uzbekistan's] mineral deposits." It doesn't seem obvious to Khanna that Russia and China are quite natural trading partners and sources of foreign investment.
Overall, just about the worst book I've ever read, and exceedingly dishonest to boot.
 bordering on fraudulent July 18, 2008
81 out of 81 found this review helpful
Some of the various, and numerous, factual errors that riddle the book are relatively trivial, but suggest serious sloppiness and disregard for getting facts right. For example, Yugoslavia was not part of Warsaw pact, as Khanna states. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was appointed to office in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin, and not by Vladimir Putin. Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are not all smaller by population than Manhattan, and the death toll from the civil wars in former Yugoslavia was not greater than half a million. Other obviously wrong assertions seem to be made up simply to provide lurid background color to Khanna's travelogue: the former KGB headquarters in Moscow has not been turned into "a high-class disco," expensive Moscow malls do not charge entrance fees, and police road checkpoints in Uzbekistan do not stop and check all vehicles. And other gross misstatements of fact display a simple complete lack of understanding the history and culture of the countries of which he writes: the (Orthodox) Uspenky cave monastery in Crimea is not representative of Ukraine's "proud Catholic heritage," Zoran Djindjic was not the first democratically elected leader since World War II in former Yugoslavia , and in the 1980s Yugoslav republics like Bosnia and Macedonia were not richer than Spain. Many of Khanna's wildly wrong claims sound like local myths that he has taken at face value. I can easily imagine some misguided elderly Belgrade resident waxing nostalgically for the days "when every one of our republics was richer than Spain!"
Yet more of Khanna's assertions are not merely factually wrong, but far exceed the ludicrous. In the fast paced and dangerous Russian business world, "one is safe only in the sauna, where everyone is naked and no weapons are allowed." It was news to me to learn from Khanna that every winter "waves" of Russians and "thousands of Ukrainians" freeze to death in "crumbling heatless apartment blocks." And he employs gross mischaracterizations of fact to buttress his claims. For example, according to Khanna, in 2006 Greek GDP increased 25% when the government started to account for prostitution and cigarette smuggling in its figures. In fact, the government said it would include all unreported economic activity, mostly in construction and trade, but including a "small" amount for illegal activities such as smuggling. And this is merely a sampling of patently ridiculous claims.
And for a "foreign policy whiz-kid," Khanna makes numerous and serious analytical mistakes, showing a clear misunderstanding of economics, international institutions, and international relations. The unhedged statement, "Russia's diplomatic position is purely residual," will surely surprise diplomats from Brussels to Tokyo. Noting that Gazprom's market capitalization is $300 billion leads Khanna to the conclusion that Gazprom is one third of the Russian economy, confusing market capitalization with GDP. And his bald assertion that "[n]one of Central Asian legal systems have evolved beyond Kakfaaesque" is belied by the numerous successful legislative accomplishments of Kazakhstan and its quite sophisticated legal code, for example.
But the worst moments of Khanna's book are when he quotes conversations that seem of such dubious authenticity as to make me believe they may be fabricated, or at best the result of very selective reporting, only relating those comments that fit within his pre-existing views. "'Our pride has suffered'" explains a "Moscow intellectual over a narrow glass of [of course] ice-chilled vodka, `but this only drives our nationalism further.'" In Kiev, the locals "give lifts to strangers for a token fare." Why? "We suffered enough together, so we still trust each other." There are just too many such (anonymous) quotations that fail to ring true to trust in the author's integrity. And he also reports statements by national leaders as if they were heard in personal conversation, yet in a curiously implied fashion that suggests otherwise.
A whirlwind geopolitical tour. July 8, 2008
The best part of the book is the conclusion where it presents to the US reader a combo of a wake up call and a call to action to challenge the misconceived American self-entitlement and eroding hegemony. Great primer on geopolitical players but not completely flawless. Obviously Khanna is enamored with the EU and China. He almost intentionally ignores India's impact but devotes sub sections on Egypt and the Balkan states? Weird, but a good read overall.
 A Great Travelogue, a Disappointing Conclusion June 23, 2008
4 out of 4 found this review helpful
Parag Khanna's travelogue of the world is a good read for 320 or so of its 343 pages. I suggest you keep Google close by however, as Khanna's world tour touches on multiple historical events and places that it does not describe in enough detail, which is understandable in order to keep the book slim enough to draw in readers. Khanna does, helpfully, include regional maps that I found myself constantly flipping to in order to keep track of his travels.
Of the 320 pages or so I enjoyed, one downside was Khanna's overly optimistic view at times of global relations. In discussing China and Japan for example, Khanna ignores the legacy of World War II and continuing fear and dislike between those two important Pacific powers. Another example is Khanna's discussion of the European Union. The EU nations have certainly coalesced in many circumstances around a common purpose, but they do not yet speak as one. Ireland's recent vote against the EU treaty testifies to that face. I felt Khanna did this often, papering over disagreements between nations in favor of what draws them closer together. That could be a good political strategy, but it can also be a bit intellectually dishonest.
But the real downside to the book is its conclusion. After an interesting, compelling travelogue Khanna begins a twenty page rant as to why everything America does is wrong and cannot be restored. It is not constructive. The journal Democracy really nails down the problem in its review of The Second World, comparing it disfavorably to Fareed Zakaria's more constructive "The Post-American World." You can read the review here: http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6626
Another oddity I noticed in the book is Khanna's brief discussion of Israel. On pages 209 and 210 of the hardcover edition, he makes the sweeping statement that "Until Palestinians are granted statehood, pressure on Hamas to recognize Israel is premature and ironic precisely because Palestine is an entity, not a state, and thus is in no position to offer such legal recognition." The statement struck me as strange for a few reasons. First, don't we usually expect organizations, companies, and people to recognize nations? Do I have to be a nation myself to recognize that Ghana, to pick a random example, is a country? Second, the statement is pretty sweeping and probably deserves its own book. But that is all Khanna has to say on the subject. That brief passage stuck out to me as I was reading the book, an uncomfortable speed bump as I was cruising through a great read (again, this was before the disappointing conclusion).
If you are picking up the book, I suggest skipping the conclusion and enjoying Khanna's many insights on the multitude of nations most of us do not think much about, but are all important in their own spheres, and globally.
Tried & true maybe? May 22, 2008
3 out of 3 found this review helpful
I watched an interview with the author of this book on PBS with Charlie Rose. He was knowledgeable and interesting so I bought the book. Most of what he writes about is still in the proving stage, time will tell how correct he is.
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